Original article: Exdiplomático británico Alastair Crooke: “Irán lleva décadas planeando esta guerra asimétrica”
By Marco Fernandes
Alastair Crooke is one of the most influential figures analyzing the relations between the West and the Islamic world. A former British diplomat and high-ranking MI6 agent, Crooke has been an active participant in geopolitics for many years. His political significance is underscored by his crucial role in mediating conflicts in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and particularly in the Middle East. As an adviser to Javier Solana, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (1997-2003), Crooke facilitated direct dialogues with groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, arguing that sustainable peace requires recognition and dialogue with actors who possess popular legitimacy, regardless of how they are labeled by Western capitals.
Crooke is also the founder and director of the Conflicts Forum in Beirut, which examines geopolitical and geo-financial changes with a focus on the Middle East, and the author of the excellent book «Resistance: The Essence of the Islamist Revolution» (Resistencia: La esencia de la revolución islamista). In this work, Crooke argues that the Islamic revolution was not merely another political movement of the 20th century but a profound rejection of Western liberal materialism in search of an authentic spiritual and communal identity.
In a lengthy Zoom conversation with Brasil de Fato from his residence in Italy, Crooke provides an incisive analysis of the current dynamics of the war provoked by the United States and Israel against Iran. He also reflects on the potential shifts in the geopolitical and economic power balance regionally and globally, along with deep insights into the evolution of the Islamic revolution, its significant advancements, and the challenges it faces in the coming years.
This interview will be published in three parts: in this first installment, Crooke breaks down Iran’s military strategy, reflects on Israel’s dire internal situation, outlines possible scenarios for Shiite responses in the region, and analyzes the likely involvement of China and Russia in the conflict, potentially solidifying a powerful anti-imperialist alliance that has been feared by the U.S. Deep State for decades.
According to Crooke, Iran has learned crucial lessons from the U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003), which partly explains its military successes so far. For instance, if «we cannot have an air force capable of challenging Israel or the United States, (…) what do we do? (…) We should not create an air force. (…) Missiles can become Iran’s air force.» Similarly, to resist U.S. supremacy in satellites and information, «you do not leave your entire military structure exposed to be bombed (…) what should be done is (…) buried deeply,» for which Iran initially received help from North Korea. Finally, the creation of the so-called «resistance mosaic» decentralized military command, preventing a «decapitation strike» of political and military leaders—as was seen with Saddam Hussein and his generals—from hindering the resistance strategy against foreign invasion.
Here’s the first part of this exclusive interview with Brasil de Fato:
— After more than four weeks of warfare, Iran has faced countless attacks, with over 2,000 fatalities and more than 3 million displaced. However, there are several signs that Iran is gaining an upper hand against the U.S. and Israel — as recently stated by Sir Alex Younger, former head of MI6 — controlling the Strait of Hormuz and driving up energy prices. Yet, Iran has only just begun to utilize its more sophisticated missiles and has already inflicted significant damage on Israel, in addition to attacking and/or destroying around 13 U.S. bases in the region. You’ve stated in previous interviews that the second U.S. war against Iraq (2003) provided significant lessons for Iranian resistance strategy. Could you elaborate on these lessons? And what has Iran also learned from the wars waged by Israel in recent years? In summary, what are the main elements of Iran’s resistance strategy against its current adversaries and why has it been so effective?
— The first thing to say, which is the most obvious, is that this is something Western countries have great difficulty dealing with. This is an asymmetrical war that has been planned for decades. Because they are used to conventional warfare. Essentially, two air forces facing off, and the one with more planes wins. So, Iran realized this and clearly saw what happened in 2003 in Baghdad. The Americans carried out that conventional war, what I call «shoot and run.» You launch a massive airstrike and destroy the command structures of Saddam Hussein and his military in three weeks. The Iranians analyzed this deeply and thought: well, how do we avoid this? Because we don’t have an air force. We can’t have an air force capable of challenging Israel or the United States. So, what do we do? And thus they came up with this idea, essentially, that, in terms of an air force, you should not create one. Don’t try to compete with an air force. Missiles can become Iran’s air force. And that is effectively what happened. So that was a lesson that needed to be understood. And Iran invested enormous amounts of thought and effort into technology because the West remains largely Orientalist and imagines that Iran does not possess modern technology.
In fact, if you look at some technological statistics published by specialized magazines, in about six or eight different tech areas, Iran ranks among the top 10 countries, sometimes in the top four. They have excellent technical and engineering capabilities. Therefore, they have invested much of that intellectual effort into their missiles, and they are at the forefront, although not in all missile-related areas. Russia has a range of specialized knowledge, but sometimes they fail, and that is why the Chinese respect Iran’s technical competence. That was the first lesson.
The second lesson was not to leave the entire military structure exposed to be bombed. That is foolish. Therefore, what should be done is to bury it, to bury it deeply, so that, even if bombed multiple times, it remains unharmed and safe. We saw that effect in missile cities. We have some famous ones, like the Saryazd Fortress, that enormous mountain where the big missiles are managed. It was reinforced with special concrete, but it is located more than 500 meters deep in the mountain. It has a railway system, and that system takes the missiles to a sort of entrance. There are several tunnel entrances. The missiles come out of the railway system and launch directly from it; they are not mobile launchers as the Israelis and Americans claim. They come directly from the railway system, and a new one is placed in its place. The Israelis and Americans have been constantly bombing Saryazd over the past four weeks, and even when the bombings finish, those big missiles keep coming out of the silos, straight from the depths, rising and launching. So, bury your infrastructure.
It is also true that it is buried in a naval sense. It is buried along the coast of Hormuz and along the entire Iranian coast. In any case, it is filled with caves and enclosures; it is truly a maze of anti-ship missiles. And these are located in cliffs. Additionally, they have tunnels that run under the sea and submersible drones that can be launched from tunnels beneath the Strait of Hormuz. These drones have lithium batteries, giving them a four-day autonomy. They are guided by AI, allowing them to autonomously locate and attack their targets. They can stay on standby for a target and then select one and strike. They also have mini submarines. I believe they have about 25 mini submarines. And one wonders: «Well, what are the mini submarines for?» The objective of the mini submarines is that the Strait of Hormuz is not very deep. That is why there is so much talk about the main channels through which ships pass, and then the special channel near Kishinev Island. Therefore, the submarines can enter the Strait of Hormuz. That is the objective. They can launch anti-ship missiles while submerged. Once again, invisible to satellites, AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] and everything else. So, that was another element. Protecting oneself from American eyes was another lesson learned from the Iraq War, and this is reflected in the fact that, in the first phase of this war, Iran destroyed all radar and information stations in the Gulf, and several others elsewhere, and just yesterday destroyed another one, one of the few AWACS operating in the area. So, they lost much of their capability because it is not just about seeing a missile coming and giving the alert, which they now no longer do to the Israelis. It is just one minute, whereas it used to be three or four. If you are limited in the number of interceptors you have left, you do not have that time that the radar gives you to decide and adjust your air defenses, so you won’t have much success in air defense.
And then the other aspect of the warfare they learned was what is now called «mosaic,» but it is a process by which they divided all of Iran into autonomous commands. There is a small central command, but ultimately it is dispersed across the country into autonomous commands. And these autonomous commands have pre-established plans to continue the war autonomously in the event of losing the central command. I saw that; in fact, it was put to the test. I was in Lebanon in 2006 during the war there, and Hezbollah was using that; in fact, Hezbollah took me south and I could see what was happening. So they had those autonomous commands and cooperated with each other. This occurred at the end of the war because they weren’t allowed to enter during it, but orders were given. I spoke with some commanders, but they had their plans to continue the war even if Beirut no longer existed. That’s how things were in 2006. Now, many years later, that is what has been implemented. It’s all the machinery coming into action based on pre-agreed plans to continue the conflict. They do not need permission, as they have the authority to act on their own initiative and possess their own missiles and forces. So, that was really what I call the third lesson of the asymmetrical war that the Iranians developed as a result of Iraq and have been planning for two decades against the United States and its bases in the region.
And it is very mentally challenging for the West to think about this because their processes consist of «bombing them to hell,» as Trump says. And, in fact, that did not work in 2006 in Lebanon because I remember that at first, the Israelis thought it would be a short military operation, under a week. And so, they had a list of targets for a week. And, of course, once the target list was exhausted, what do you do? Well, you can’t go back to commanders, or political elites, and say: «Well, we don’t have any targets left; let’s go home for lunch.» That does not work. So they keep bombing civilian places, whatever. And most of the time, they were bombing mannequins and mock-ups of mobile launchers, not the real ones. And they were bringing those mobile launchers back into hiding in no time. I mean, literally, I remember something like 90 seconds, they would put them back and leave. Too fast for the Israelis to attack. So the main missiles of Hezbollah were in enormous tunnels. They had their own missile tunnels. I have been in those tunnels. If you had gone until 2011, you could have gone there and seen them. It is called «Spider Web.» They could show you what they were using. Much of the bombing we have heard about is the same as we hear from the West in all countries. «Ah, there were 38,000 combat missions.» We hear the same thing. It was the same in the bombing of Belgrade: 38,000 attacks. And in the end, the Serbian army was practically intact. I think it lost 40 armored vehicles or something, but it was intact. They were not bombed.
And then the question is: was that bombing effective? It is not about how many bombs were dropped because we know that many of those bombs, especially now, are dropped by the Israelis. I cite Iranian sources on this issue, but the Iranians say that 20 hospitals were hit in Tehran. 20 hospitals were hit and, when it comes to injured children, around 600 schools were bombed and over 1,000 children were hurt. It should not surprise us. That is what Israel does in Gaza. That is what they do in Lebanon. That is what they consider pressure. It is pressure on Iran to capitulate, to demoralize the people. But that does not work. The Americans, in fact, know this, but sometimes those messages get lost. Because they know there has never been a case where a so-called regime change was achieved solely through air power. They cite Belgrade, but that was not the case. The government fell later for other reasons, but not due to the bombing. Therefore, there is no doubt that Israeli-American bombing is destructive, but it is not effective.
And obviously, Iran has a plan. And it is a phase. And the other thing they learned from that war in 2003 was that Americans generally only have the logistical capacity for a short-term force. Therefore, the answer is: we do a long-term job, and we do it well. And that is what they are doing. And thus, missiles are launched with a lot of caution. Therefore, the intention is that at some point — we do not know exactly when, according to their plan — this will reach a climax with the launch of more advanced missiles. Initially, the Iranians were using missiles from the 2012-2013 production batch, essentially to test the defense systems, see where they are and exhaust interception capacity. So those were the ideas that guided the planning. And then, of course, there was all the planning for contingencies and other things to do, depending on what the subsequent reaction of the U.S. and Israel might be.
— According to the latest bulletin from your Conflicts Forum, the situation in Israel seems headed for disaster. Former Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) ombudsman, Yitzhak Brik, stated: «What awaits Israel in the next phase [of the war] is terrifying» — «Israel is not strategically prepared for a multi-front war that threatens our very existence». Israel has built — in recent years — the narrative of the IDF as a superpower — a highly efficient army for killing unarmed women and children, by the way— but now it appears everything is crumbling. This week, both the Yemenis of Ansarallah and the Resistance in Iraq have joined the war and have already launched attacks against Israel. What are the prospects for Israel in the coming weeks if the war drags on?
— This is having an effect because part of the Israeli press we follow, analyze, and publish in detail [in the Conflicts Forum Substack], is reporting it. We have high-ranking generals saying, «We cannot go on.» The Chief of Staff of the army attended the cabinet security meeting in recent days and said: «This is a crisis.» He shouted at them: «We cannot continue like this! We need to recruit another 400,000 men. We are losing people. The entire plan is crumbling!» That is what they were saying. The crisis is also occurring in Lebanon because Hezbollah has destroyed 21 Makarov tanks in a single day in recent days. And, in most cases, their crews were also hit. Some managed to escape, but most died. The Israelis admitted they had to limit the type of response to only 12 anti-tank missiles per day because that is all they have to ration munitions. But the war is much larger. And I believe that is part of the plan. Additionally, we are also undergoing a massive change in Iraq.
— What is happening in Iraq at the moment? What are some of the repercussions within the Shiite community in the region?
— The assassination of the Supreme Leader, leader of Shiite Islam and a highly revered religious figure, has ignited Shiite sentiments everywhere, especially in Iraq. The Hashad [A-Shaabi, a front formed by between 50,000 and 70,000 popular militias, which have joined the regular armed forces but report to three other organizations] are gearing up, and several ayatollahs of the mujahideen have called for jihad, a mandatory and legitimate jihad. I do not believe we have reached that point yet because I think in Iraq they are discussing defensive jihad, but I think you will see it in the coming period. Because there is a gray area in Iraq between formal military forces and Hashad — the Americans call them PMF [Popular Mobilization Forces]. But now they are at the border of Kuwait. They are attacking in Erbil. I think you will see them advance even further. It seems quite probable they will take Kuwait and that Iran will take Bahrain. I don’t know, no one has told me this specifically, it’s just my interpretation of the situation on the ground. I would say that is where things are headed. Therefore, we have a different kind of war than what the United States thought it would be facing.
— I was speaking with a friend who works for Iranian media, and he told me that apparently, the Iranians learned about this underground deep tunnel technology from North Korea. Do you know anything about that?
— I believe they have provided assistance to Iran in that area and in missile-related activities. I think Iran has received support from other parties.
— Given the concepts of «asymmetrical warfare» and «resistance mosaic,» you’ve described an impressive military strategy from Iran. Do you think the Iranians could be initiating a new chapter in modern military strategy?
— Yes, much of this can be attributed to Qasem Soleimani and his initiatives. But the same has been happening in Ukraine. The innovations that the Russians have been introducing, especially regarding missiles and drones, are a result of that exchange, since the Shahed drones were lent to Russia, which improved some of them and returned them. But I don’t think the Iranians would say that is exclusively theirs. I think the Iranians have done a lot on their own initiative, which is extraordinary. But they do not claim it all. Their missiles have characteristics, especially the Fatah-2 and others, which likely also surprised China and Russia. This was achieved through Iran’s own inventions, not copied from elsewhere. But yes, it is a new kind of war. What will this mean? It means that all the old concepts that still persist — many Western military personnel still talk about Operation Desert Storm — all those grand doctrines have truly become obsolete now.
— There are many debates about China’s support regarding radars, the Ocean One ship, and apparently also rumors about Russian support to Iran, perhaps in intelligence, or maybe other things we don’t know, some of which we may never know, actually. In the case of China, it would be unprecedented in many decades. But what is your assessment of that? Do you think China and Russia are really making a difference in this war? For example, there are reports from U.S. authorities who say they were surprised by the effectiveness of some Iranian attacks compared to the 12-Day War. And if so, if China and Russia are indeed helping and supporting Iran, could we say that perhaps the nightmare of [Zbigniew] Brzezinski — who stated in The Grand Chessboard that an alliance between China, Russia, and Iran would be unbearable for the United States — is consolidating as a sort of front line in the anti-hegemonic struggle?
— I believe it is not yet consolidated. That is a different question, which is very important. But I will just say something about the first. I think some time ago, the Iranians realized that their reliance on U.S. GPS was being used against them. And so, first, they migrated to the Russian system, Glonass. And then they migrated to the Beidou system, within that 25-year partnership agreement with China. China granted them the rights to use the most sophisticated military version of that data. And of course, China possesses the satellites. And I believe China has established satellite connections with Iran so that they can have access to that. So, it is pretty obvious. I’m not revealing any secrets here because Iran knows when B-1s take off from the airbase in Britain and the exact time. Therefore, they have a complete view. In the war against Russia, the U.S. IRS [Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance] structures, the satellites, the ability to have an integrated map of the front line and of the targets from radars and AWACS, all unified in an integrated system, was really NATO’s main contribution to the war against Russia.
The Russians always complained about the AWACS: «Where did those data come from?» Well, they didn’t come from the Ukrainians because it’s ultra-secret, etc. So what you are seeing now is actually the opposite. It seems that Iran possesses this IRS battlefield system to counter the Americans. So, while the Americans would implement it against Russia, perhaps Russia has some restrictions. There is always that issue in Russia, but why didn’t they shoot down the AWACS that was flying over the Black Sea or something? They didn’t do it, anyway. But Iran is doing it. And therefore, I believe there has been a huge change in the war, in IRS capability. I don’t know the extent of this. I do not have special information on that. But it is what I believe has been happening. So, this has support. I think both Russia and China are happy to support behind the scenes. They do not want to put Chinese equipment on the ground where it can be seen by people. But you cannot see data flows. You cannot see that they are generating data flows, whether they come, for example, from the Ocean One ship, which is Chinese. It is a complex ship that conducts interceptions, operates with radar and also acts underwater. Therefore, it is in a state of war. And I believe what is different in this war is that, on the one hand, from the U.S. side, there are no restrictions. Legality, human rights issues, the United Nations, all that has disappeared. Power is the reason. And that is how things are. However, Iran continues not to follow that pattern. They follow an escalation pattern. If they are attacked on a certain type of target, then they counterattack and simultaneously escalate the action. Therefore, it is a step and an escalation to deter the United States and Israel from proceeding down that path. These things are certainly a significant difference and a change in warfare. A bit frightening. No rules, a whirlwind, genocide, all those things. The kidnapping of leaders, the assassination of leaders, decapitation, homicide. I mean, a long time ago, wars were, in a way, much more of a ritual. People lined up, there were rules, and someone said, «Okay, start the battle.» We have gone to the other extreme.
* Interview by Marco Fernandes for Brasil de Fato, shared for publication in El Ciudadano with the author’s permission.
